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INTRODUCTION
Enforcing a prohibition on disparate impact in higher education
admissions would force schools to discard or reform admissions criteria
that have an unfair and unnecessary discriminatory effect on minority appli-
cants.' Disparate impact claims would force liable schools, and encourage
schools not yet subject to suit, to implement admissions policies that ren-
der diverse student bodies to the greatest extent possible, while still
allowing schools to admit the most qualified students.
* B.A. 2000, University of Virginia; J.D. Candidate 2004, University of Michigan
Law School. I would like to thank the staff of the MichiganJournal of Race & Law, especially
Jessie Gabriel and Rebecca Gilmer, for their invaluable work in making this Note publish-
able.
1. This Note will focus on disparate impact in admissions based on race, but an
admissions system could have a disparate impact on any protected category of persons.The
term "minority" will refer to all persons who racially identify as something other than
White.
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A prohibition on disparate impact makes presumptively invalid any
policy that has a discriminatory effect on a protected category of persons,
such as a racial group, regardless of the policy's intent.2 In order to survive
a legal challenge, the defendant must prove that the policy is a necessity,
meaning that it is the least discriminatory means of meeting its institu-
tional needs. 3 In the seminal disparate impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power
Co. ,4 an employer issued a blanket requirement that all employees have a
high school diploma.' The policy eliminated a far greater number of
Black applicants than White applicants.6 According to the Court, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits disparate impact caused
by employment criteria, required the employer to show that a high school
education was a necessary qualification for an employee to do the job for
which he was being hired . The Court acknowledged that a high school
diploma was a reasonable criterion, but found that it was largely unrelated
to the specific skills and abilities needed to perform the job.8 Because the
criterion was both discriminatory in its effect and unnecessary, it was un-
fair to Black applicants and violated Title VII.9
If applied to higher education admissions processes, disparate impact
analysis would reveal equivalent flaws in higher education admissions
policies and criteria. Schools would be forced to alter policies that unnec-
essarily reject minority applicants more readily than White applicants. For
instance, if a law school were to reject a block of applicants because they
failed to achieve a minimum score on the Law School Admission Test
(LSAT), and that minimum score had the effect of eliminating a dispro-
portionate number of minority applicants, the policy would be
presumptively invalid.'° A school would then have to show two things:
first, that the chosen cut-off point was consistent with the school's need
to admit the most qualified applicants, and second, that the cut-off was
the most effective means of doing so." Criteria like privileges for legacies,
extracurricular experience, and Advanced Placement credits, that advan-
tage applicants from wealthier school districts and wealthier families, and
disproportionately disqualify minority applicants, could also be chal-
2. Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2003); Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36 (1971).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
4. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
5. Id. at 427.
6. Id. at 426.
7. Id. at 431.
8. Id. at 433.
9. Id. at 432-33.
10. See Preston C. Green, III, Can Title VI Prevent Law Schools From Adopting Admis-
sions Practices That Discriminate Against African Americans?, 24 S.U. L. REv. 237, 254-55
(1997).
11. See id. at 256-57.
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lenged. If schools could not show that the existing criteria were necessary
and the only available building blocks of a successful admissions process,
then the criteria would have to be reworked in a manner that had an eq-
uitable result.
As it stands, admissions policies are not widely examined for unfair
discriminatory effect.1 2 Instead, schools employ affirmative action to cor-
rect what are possibly unnecessary disparities. The effect is to implicitly
legitimize what might be racially inequitable and imprecise criteria.
Schools are in some sense applying a band-aid instead of curing the ail-
ment. Minority applicants appear to be under-qualified, when the true
culprit may be that the existing criteria are imperfect measures of the
qualifications for admission. Prohibiting disparate impact would force a
correction of this potential imperfection, making the admissions process
fundamentally racially unbiased.
Disparate impact analysis would for this reason be a viable compro-
mise between advocates of diversity and advocates of race neutral
admissions. By forcing renovation of the race neutral aspects of admissions
systems such that those systems would become more equal in their effect,
disparate impact analysis would foster diversity within a "colorblind"
meritocracy. Indeed, given that the constitutionality of race conscious
admissions is terminal," and states are increasingly prohibiting such
12. Disparate impact analysis can be applied to admissions under regulations prom-
ulgated under Title VI by the Department of Education. 34 C.E1. § 106.21 (2004); 34
C.FR. § 100, app. B; see also Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,288-91 (2001). Only one
complaint has been brought under these regulations, however. After the removal of af-
firmative action policies in California's public universities, several civil rights groups filed a
complaint with the Department of Education against University of California law schools,
alleging a disparate impact caused by the use of the LSAT, in violation ofTitle VI. See Wil-
liam C. Kidder, Does the LSAT Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational
Attainment:A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1065
(2001).
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346-47 (2003). According to the
Court:
We are mindful, however, that '[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based
on race.' Accordingly, race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in
time. This requirement reflects that racial classifications, however compelling
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed no more
broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justification for
racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle.
We see no reason to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the
requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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policies on their own, 4 it may eventually be necessary for diversity advo-
cates to develop an alternative to affirmative action.
Current federal law allows for the application of disparate impact
analysis to higher education but only in the form of an administrative
action, initiated under the Department of Education regulations imple-
menting Title VI." No private cause of action for disparate impact exists
under Title VI,16 and there is no consensus among federal courts as to
whether an individual can sue under Section 1983 to enforce Title VI
disparate impact regulations.17 Congress could, of course, amend Title VI
or pass a new statute specifically addressing disparate impact in higher
education to create such a right.
However, the details of how disparate impact scrutiny would func-
tion in higher education, and why it should be applied, are essentially
unexplored."' Courts have applied disparate impact analysis to educational
institutions, but only to desegregate public school districts, 9 and to test
the validity of standardized tests used for tracking or as graduation re-
quirements.2 0 The only instance in which a court has dealt with disparate
14. See William C. Kidder & Jay Rosner, How the SAT Creates "Built-In Headwinds ":
An Education and Legal Analysis of Disparate Impact, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 131, 193
nn.32-36 (2002) (discussing new facially neutral admissions policies, based on high school
grades, implemented by the California, Florida, and Texas state systems).
15. See 34 C.ER. § 106.21 (2004); 34 C.ER. § 100, app. B; see also Alexander v.
Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-91 (2001). Title VI prohibits discrimination by any entity
receiving federal funding. 42 U.S.C. 5 2000d-1.
16. Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 280-86.
17. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Using .5 1983 to Enforce Title Vi's Section 602 Regula-
tions, 49 U. KAN'. L. REV. 321 (2001); see also Derek Black, Picking Up The Pieces After
Alexander v. Sandoval: Resurrecting a Private Cause of Action for Disparate Impact, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 356 (2002); Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 176-77.
18. A few authors have made arguments for and against applying disparate impact to
admissions processes. See Green, supra note 10;William C. Kidder, The Rise of the Testocracy:
An Essay on the LSAT, Conventional Wisdom, and the Dismantling of Diversity, 9 TEx. J.
WOMEN & L. 167 (2000); James S. Wrona, Eradicating Sex Discrimination in Education: Ex-
tending Disparate Impact Analysis to Title IX Litigation, 21 PFpp. L. REV. 1 (1993). A recent
article by Kidder and Rosner provides data for and outlines the factual arguments neces-
sary to make a claim of disparate impact, specifically against the use of the SAT. See Kidder
& Rosner, supra note 14. The most comprehensive discussion of disparate impact in the
educational sphere pertains to high-stakes testing in secondary school and argues against
using disparate impact analysis. See Jennifer C. Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of
Disparate Impact Theory to Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAID. L. REV. 1111
(2002).
19. See, e.g., In the Matter of Maywood School District #89, Docket No. 125, avail-
able at 1985 WL 306717 (Dep't Educ. June 12, 1985) (applying Department of Education
disparate impact regulations promulgated underTitleVI).
20. See, e.g.,Jay P. Heubert, Nondiscriminatory Use of High-Stakes Tests: Combining Pro-
fessional Test-Use Standards with Federal Civil-Rights Enforcement, 133 ED. L. REP. 17 (1999).
Tracking is a term used to signify the practice of organizing elementary and secondary
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impact in higher education is through the lens of athletics, when Black
student athletes challenged the academic requirements of the National
Collegiate Athletic Association."
Using Title VII disparate impact jurisprudence as a point of depar-
ture, this Note argues that higher education admissions policies should be
subjected to disparate impact scrutiny, and proposes a feasible and effective
judicial standard specifically conceived for this context. Part I proposes
both remedial and instrumental justifications for applying disparate impact
scrutiny to admissions policies. This Part argues that disparate impact
analysis should be applied to higher education as a remedy for the disad-
vantage minority applicants face as a result of historic and ongoing
intentional discrimination and that schools are culpable for unnecessarily
utilizing admissions criteria that have this discriminatory effect. The result
of applying disparate impact analysis will be admissions policies that pro-
duce diverse student bodies while remaining facially neutral with regard
to race. Part II proposes that a necessity standard, unique to the higher
education context, be fashioned such that admissions policies are made as
equitable as possible while not undermining a school's ability to achieve
its legitimate admissions goals. The proper necessity standard would grant
schools latitude to define their institutional goals, but at the same time
require that their admissions criteria be the least discriminatory methods
of achieving these goals. Finally, Part III shows that a court can feasibly
and effectively apply disparate impact analysis to admissions processes de-
spite their complexity and variety.
I. REMEDIAL AND INSTRUMENTAL JUSTIFICATIONS FOR
APPLYING DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS TO ADMISSIONS
While intentional racial discrimination is probably no longer preva-
lent in admissions, race is not yet irrelevant to competing for admission.
Historical discrimination in public education, housing, and employment,
and ongoing intentional and institutional discrimination in those areas,
disadvantage minorities competing for admission. To the extent that an
admissions process has a disparate impact because of this disadvantage,
minority applicants are still disqualified unfairly because of their race. It is,
furthermore, socially optimal to force schools to remedy this unfair dis-
criminatory effect. If admissions criteria cause a disparate impact
unnecessarily-meaning that a school's admissions goals and operational
needs can be met by more equitable criteria-the school should be
viewed as having implemented an admissions system that is defective un-
der disparate impact scrutiny.
school students into ability groups upon which the subject matter and difficulty of their
classes will be based.
21. See Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 E3d 548 (3rd Cir. 2002).
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In the process of eliminating unfair discriminatory effect, disparate
impact analysis would force schools to use facially neutral criteria that are
truly representative of applicants' merit. No longer will criteria
imprecisely measure merit such that some students are disqualified
because of their racial experience instead of their individual potential as a
student. Thus, admissions processes that withstand disparate impact
analysis will admit diverse student bodies and value diversity, while
remaining facially neutral. Diversity is a compelling interest in higher
education,22 but race conscious admissions is a controversial method of
achieving diversity in the student body.2 Disparate impact analysis is thus
a viable compromise between these positions.
A. Remedying Unfair Discrimination
This Section argues that a discriminatory effect is unfair when it oc-
curs as a result of historical intentional discrimination.24 Schools should be
22. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003).
23. See, e.g., SHELBY STEELE,A DREAm DEFERRED 20 (1998); Robert S. Chang, Reverse
Racism!: Affirmative Action, the Family, and the Dream That Is America, 23 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 1115 (1996);Allen R. Kamp, The Missing Jurisprudence of Merit, 11 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
141 (2002) (citing HUGH DAVID GRAHt, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1972 (1990)); Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of
Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953,962 (1996).
24. Two paradigms of unjust discrimination predominate in American anti-
discrimination jurisprudence: prohibitions on discriminatory treatment and those on dis-
criminatory effect. Discriminatory treatment refers to policies or acts performed on the
basis of impermissible traits such as race or gender. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (prohibiting
discrimination by an employer "because" of an individual's race); Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 280 (2001) (interpreting Title VI of the Civil Rights Act); Washington V.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976) (interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). Prohibitions on discriminatory treatment contemplate both policies
that are facially discriminatory and those that are facially neutral but fashioned or imple-
mented with the intent to discriminate. See Washington, 426 U.S. at 239-41; see alsoYick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Schools explicitly segregated on the basis of race are
therefore unlawful. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-94 (1954). It is likewise
unlawful for a state actor to confer business licenses to some applicants and not others on
the basis of their race. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 373-74.
A finding of discriminatory effect, however, does not require purposeful discrimina-
tion. Regardless of a policy's face or underlying impetus, if it disproportionately impacts a
protected category of persons, without a showing of necessity, the policy is invalid under
Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(k) (2003); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-36 (1971); Kermit Welch, The Changing Disparate Impact Theory of Employment
Discrimination, 34 How. L.J. 331 (1991) (discussing disparate impact theory and the devel-
opment of the doctrine). For example, a zoning ordinance against multi-family housing
that inordinately deprives minorities of housing opportunities fails under disparate impact
analysis. Huntington v. NAACP, 488 U.S. 15 (1988) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3601). Of the two, discriminatory treatment, because of the presence of intent,
often registers as more reprehensible and its prohibition therefore more justified than the
prohibition on discriminatory effect. Mere effect is often seen as accidental, and it is there-
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liable for a discriminatory effect, even where they have no discriminatory
intent, when their admissions systems produce the effect unnecessarily.
Because the institutions are in the best position to adjust their practices in
order to eliminate discriminatory effect in admissions,2 disparate impact
analysis would properly impose upon schools a duty to create the least
discriminatory admissions system possible.
1. Discriminatory Effect Is UnfairWhen It Is a
Product of Intentional Discrimination
While intentional discrimination may not be a persistent problem in
higher education admissions, race remains a factor in the process. The
most commonly used admissions criteria, without affirmative action, ad-
mit minorities less readily than Whites.26 This disparate impact caused by
admissions policies is unfair, even where it is not intentional, when the
persistent effects of past intentional discrimination cause the disparate im-
pact on minorities because of their race. 27 Facially neutral admissions
criteria can thereby be unfair to minorities.28
The Supreme Court has recognized that unintentional discrimina-
tory effect can be a consequence of past intentional discrimination and
stated that "deficiencies in the education and background of minority
citizens, resulting from forces beyond their control [should] not be al-
lowed to work a cumulative and invidious burden on such citizens for the
remainder of their lives." 29 The Court applied this principle in Griggs v.
Duke Power Co. 30 In Griggs, the Duke Power Company required that
workers achieve a minimum score on two standardized tests to be pro-
moted beyond entry-level positions. ' The tests formed a practically
impenetrable barrier to Black employees seeking promotion.2  Duke
fore more difficult to attribute fault for causing a discriminatory effect. The policymaker is
not necessarily a "racist," and the policy is colorblind on its face.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 7 (1991).
26. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2346-47 (2003).
27. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. ArF. 107,
144-45 (1976).
28. The Supreme Court has expressed a "deep belief that legal burdens should bear
some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing, and that advancement sanc-
tioned, sponsored, or approved by the State should ideally be based on individual merit or
achievement, or at the least on factors within the control of an individual." Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 360-61 (1978) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty &
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973)
(plurality opinion)) (internal quotations omitted).
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 806 (1973) (citing Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 (1971)).
30. 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id. at 430.
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Power Company argued that the disparate impact was a result of the lesser
qualification of Black employees, based on their test scores. 33 The Griggs
court, however, concluded that, in light of the impact that inferior educa-
tional opportunities had on the ability of Black applicants to perform well
on the tests, the discriminatory effect of the tests was "directly traceable to
race."34 The rationale in Griggs was that equal opportunity does not exist
apart from historical forces.35
Similarly, common admissions criteria effectively disqualify minorities
disproportionately because of their (and their predecessors') racial experi-
ences, rather than their individual potential.36 Performance on college
admissions tests has been correlated to wealth and family educational
achievement.3 7 Historical discrimination has produced a wealth disparity
and limited educational opportunities for previous generations of minori-
ties. De facto segregation, the legacy of de jure segregation, subjects
minorities to inferior primary and secondary educational opportunities on38
average. Furthermore, as a result of past intentional discrimination, mi-
nority applicants are rarely legacies at the schools to which they apply.39 If
an admissions criterion has a disproportionate effect that is a result of the
social history of a minority group, that criteria is unfair to members of
that group, regardless of whether the disproportionate impact is inten-
tional.
40
33. Id. at 431.
34. Id. at 430.
35. See id. ("Under the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and
even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status
quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.").
36. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
37. Meredith Phillips et al., Family Background, Parenting Practices, and the Black-White
Test Score Gap, in THE BLACK WHITETEST ScoRE GAP 118 (Christopher Jencks & Meredith
Phillips eds., 1998). Minorities perform at a lower level on the SAT than majority students
in the same income class. Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 988-89. That, however, does
not refute the point that minorities are disproportionately poor compared to Whites. The
fact that higher wealth correlates with higher test scores thus has a disparate impact on
minority test-takers because minorities are disproportionately poor. Id.
38. See generally CLAUDE S. FISCHER ET AL., INEQUALITY BY DESIGN: CRACKING THE
BELL CURVE MYTH (1996);JNATHAN KoZOL, SAVAGE INEQUALITIES: CHILDREN IN AMERICA'S
SCHOOLS (1992); Gary Orfield, The Growth of Segregation: African Americans, Latinos, and
Unequal Education, in DISMANTLING DESEGREGATION: THE QUIET REVERSAL OF BROWN V.
BoARD OF EDUCATION 53 (Gary Orfield & Susan E. Eaton eds., 1996).
39. See generally Naked Hypocrisy: The Nationwide System of Affirmative Action for
Whites, 18J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 40 (Winter 1997/1998) [hereinafter Naked Hypocrisy].
40. Cf supra note 34 and accompanying text. Admittedly, this rationale for disparate
impact analysis requires acceptance of a broad empirical assumption-that most or all
members of a particular minority group have received uniformly substandard opportuni-
ties. If that is not the case, those members of a minority group who have been relatively
less inhibited by discrimination might appear to be receiving a windfall when selection
criteria are altered to the advantage of the entire minority group. Disparate impact analysis
self-corrects in this regard, however. The advantages enjoyed by less inhibited minority
[VOL. 9:467
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2. Schools Are Culpable for the Discriminatory Effect of Admissions
When Their Admissions Process Unnecessarily Causes That Effect
Disparate impact scrutiny essentially holds schools liable for failing
to implement admissions processes of a requisite quality, as defined by the
educational necessity standard. A selection criterion must serve the pur-
poses of the admissions system, such as discerning qualified applicants, and
be the least discriminatory way of serving that purpose.4 Schools must
not only institute policies with the good intention of achieving necessary
objectives, but those policies must also actually serve those purposes.42 The
Griggs Court stated this principal in the context of employment: "good
intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment
procedures [that are unrelated to measuring job capability]. ' '43 Addressing
the facts of the case, the Court stated:
On the record before us, neither the high school completion
requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown to bear
a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs for which it was used. Both were adopted, as the Court of
Appeals noted, without meaningful study of their relationship
to job-performance ability. Rather, a vice president of the
Company testified, the requirements were instituted on the
Company's judgment that they generally would improve the
overall quality of the work force. The evidence, however, shows
that employees who have not completed high school or taken
the tests have continued to perform satisfactorily and make
progress in departments for which the high school and test cri-
teria are now used."
To understand what makes admissions criteria similarly defective,
one must conceptually disconnect the qualifications for admission from• 41
the criteria used to measure those qualifications. Schools may seek to
applicants--such as good schooling, opportunity for extra-curricular experience, well-
educated parents-are similar in kind to those of the majority group; and these advantages
are nullified as much as is possible by criteria that survive disparate impact analysis. To the
extent that, under criteria altered by disparate impact analysis, slightly disadvantaged mem-
bers of a minority group succeed more than very disadvantaged members of the same
group, they do so because of their non-race-based qualifications.
41. See Part III for a more specific definition of educational necessity.
42. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32.
43. Id. at 432.
44. Id. at 431-32.
45. There are different methods by which a test can be validated for measuring a
certain skill. A test is "content validated" if the content of the examination closely matches
the content of the job (for example, a typing test for a typist position). A test is "construct
validated" if a professional job analysis shows that the job requires a series of traits that the
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admit students with certain abstract qualities such as natural aptitude,
good work ethic, creativity, analytical skills, and writing ability. They em-
ploy criteria like standardized tests, grade point average ("GPA"), and
personal essays to assess whether an applicant possesses the requisite quali-
ties for admission. These criteria may not perfectly reflect possession of
those skills. Disparate impact analysis asks whether, in light of the dis-
criminatory effect these criteria cause, they are the most precise and
46inclusive gauge of the qualities they purport to measure.
A simple diagram may help illustrate. The first figure below illus-
trates when an "Existing Admissions Criterion" effectively captures some
applicants with the "Desired Skill," but at the same time ignores many
other applicants who also have this skill. The different shades represent
different races-the darker represents the victims of historical and ongo-
ing intentional discrimination. Assume that there are equal numbers of
47
applicants in each group. The "Alternative Admissions Criterion" is
more precise and inclusive.The discriminatory effect caused by the admis-
sions criterion is therefore unnecessary, and the school failed to fulfill its
legal duty.8
In each case, the existing admissions criterion has a discriminatory
effect on a particular race. Because there is an alternative criterion that
measures the same skill but without the discriminatory effect, the existing
criterion is not a necessity and therefore fails under disparate impact scru-
tiny. The school has put forth into the admissions market a faulty criterion
in the sense that it either under-recognizes qualified applicants or unnec-
essarily discriminates against a particular racial group, and there is a less
discriminatory alternative that could be utilized.49
test is known to measure. A test is "criterion validated" if there is a substantial correlation
between measured performance on the predictor and performance on the job. See Mark
Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability"Job Testing, 104 HAsW. L. REv. 1157,
1171 (1990) (citing Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.FR.
§ 1607.5(B), 1607.16(D)-(F) (1990)).
46. This principle manifests itself in the requirement that the selection criterion are
both consistent with necessity and the least discriminatory alternative. See 42 U.S.C.
2000e-2(k) (2003); see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
47. These diagrams show a discriminatory effect in terms of the numbers of applicants
disqualified by the criterion. In actuality, a disparate impact is present whenever a racial group
is disproportionately disqualified in relation to the number of applicants of that race in the
applicant pool, even if the total number disqualified is lower. See New York City Transit Auth.
v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 598 (1979) ("In a disparate impact hiring case such as this, the plain-
tiff must show that the challenged practice excludes members of a protected group in
numbers disproportionate to their incidence in the pool of potential employees.").
48. In requiring the school to utilize the alternative criterion, the law appears to sim-
ply enlarge the applicant pool. In such a case, schools should then use a second refining
criterion instead of shrinking the applicant pool with the existing discriminatory criterion.
49. There is still the practical question of how large the discriminatory effect must
be or how much better a less discriminatory alternative must be in order to hold a school
liable. The disparate impact could at some point be considered negligible. Under Title II,
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FIGURE I
Applicants with Existing
the Desired Skill Admissions Criterion
Alternative
Admissions Criterion
Now the criterion is used to assess the applicants:
IEl
Applicants with the skill
are nevertheless excluded
by the existing criterion
and one race is
disproportionately affected.
When the alternative is used
all applicants with the skill
are measured.
The next figure illustrates a less egregious violation, but a violation
nonetheless. The "Alternative Admissions Criterion" is no more precise
but is less discriminatory in its effect. The imprecision of the criterion is
spread evenly across racial lines and is thus the just option:
FIGURE 2
Applicants with Existing
the Desired Skill Admissions Criterion
Alternative
Admissions Criterion
Again, the criterion is applied to the applicants:
Applicants with the skill
are excluded by the existing
criterion and one race is
disproportionately affected.
Applicants with the skill are
excluded by the alternative
criterion but each race is
equally affected.
EEOC regulations state that a disparate impact of sufficient size exists if an employment
criterion selects minority candidates for employment positions at a rate that is less than
eighty percent of the selection rate for non-minorities. See 29 C.FR. § 1607.4(D) (2004).
The rule to be applied to admissions could be higher or lower depending on the balance
between the importance of equality to the lawmaker and how well schools can bear the
burden of meeting the standard.
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Disparate impact analysis as applied to higher education admissions
places the burden of improving the admissions systems on the party who
can most efficiently bear the burden: the school.0 An educational institu-
tion has exclusive control over admissions and is therefore in the best
position to conduct research and development and then implement a new
system." Schools control a scarce and coveted resource for socioeconomic
opportunity. If lawmakers wish to ensure the resource is distributed fairly,
schools are the optimal party to bear the burden to do so. It is, moreover,
in a school's best interest to analyze its admissions criteria for unnecessary
disparate impact. By definition, if a certain group defined by unique so-
cioeconomic and cultural characteristics is unnecessarily disqualified by the
current admissions system, the school is eliminating an entire pool of
qualified applicants.
Jennifer Braceras argues that disparate impact should not be
extended from employers to educational institutions because, unlike
employers, schools already act in the public interest. They need not,
therefore, be regulated as closely as employers. 2 Title VII's prohibition on
disparate impact in employment is justified, she argues, because the
relationship between businesses and the public interest is to a certain
extent adversarial-that is, profit margin is sometimes in opposition to the
public interest. Because profit margin is not the primary institutional goal
of a school, Braceras argues, disparate impact analysis is an unnecessary
regulation. 3
Braceras's argument fails to recognize that a prohibition on disparate
impact is not premised on antagonism between the institution and the
public interest. Instead, disparate impact analysis is meant to weed out
neutral, but effectually discriminatory, practices. 4 Even a school with the
best of intentions may for reasons of tradition, administrative ease, or
profit motive utilize unnecessarily discriminatory admissions criteria. Also,
an adversarial relationship may exist between different segments of an
educational community for control of school policy, even if the institution
as a whole is meant to act in cooperation with the public interest. Braceras
also fails to recognize that applying disparate impact to higher education
may be, in fact, more justified than in the employment sphere precisely be-
cause schools act in the public interest. Achieving equal opportunity seems
more a part of the role of educational institutions than businesses. Because
educational institutions are committed to the public interest to a greater
50. See HR.. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 7 (1991); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling
Co., 150 P2d 436, 440 (Cal. 1944).
51. See sources cited supra note 50.
52. See Braceras, supra note 18, at 1199.
53. See id.
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2003); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 429-36 (1971).
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degree than are businesses, they should have a greater obligation to take
on the burden of alleviating unfair discrimination.
B. The Policy Benefits of Disparate Impact: Diversity
and a Colorblind Merit System
Prohibiting disparate impact analysis in higher education admissions
has an important policy benefit: admissions to higher education would be
made more equitable while still adhering to a principle of colorblind
merit. Moreover, the "qualified" applicant pool would include a more
diverse cross-section of races as a result of the elimination of imprecise
criteria that unnecessarily eliminate qualified minority applicants.
Immutable characteristics like race are considered qualitatively dis-
tinct from the concept of merit.55 These aspects of an applicant's identity
are, according to the Supreme Court, different from other aspects of an
individual's personal experience and therefore irrelevant to considerations
of merit.5 6 The traditional criteria, therefore, compose the higher educa-
tional "merit system,
5 7 and affirmative action is an exception to the rule.
8
If current higher education admissions criteria are considered the true yard-
sticks of "merit" in higher education admissions, 9 the need for affirmative
action to correct the disparate impact on minorities implies that minority
students otherwise do not deserve admission under the neutral 
criteria. 60
Race consciousness in admissions implicitly legitimizes the preexisting cri-
teria as paradigms of merit6 ' and masks their discriminatory effect by
creating an equitable bottom line.62
By eliminating any unnecessary effects that intentional discrimination
might have on admissions, disparate impact analysis ensures that the proper
race neutral qualifications, such as analytical ability or creativity, dictate ad-
63missions decisions. As the Court stated in Griggs, disparate impact analysis
55. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 675 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting);
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,361 (1978) (Brennan,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 962.
56. See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 675 (Scalia,J., dissenting); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 361 (Bren-
nan,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 962.
57. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 960-63.
58. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338-39 (2003) (holding that the law
school's affirmative action program, while violating equal protection, was justified by the
school's compelling interest in diversity).
59. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 960-63.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 956.
62. See Connecticut v.Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451 (1982).
63. Notably, merit is not a consistent principle in admissions systems as they cur-
rently exist. Legacies are admitted at higher rates than other applicants, but with lower test
scores, grades, and fewer extra-curricular activities. Naked Hypocrisy, supra note 39, at 41-
42. Preferences are even sometimes granted to children of politicians, donors, alumni, and
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does not ensure "that the less qualified be preferred over the better quali-
fied simply because of minority origins.... Far from disparaging job
qualifications as such, Congress [in passing Title VII] ... made such quali-
fications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, nationality and sex
become irrelevant.",64 The reworked admissions process may still have a
disparate impact, but only on unqualified applicants. In this sense, adher-
ence to disparate impact theory actually increases competition among
applicants by ensuring that qualifications for admission are measured pre-
cisely. Where some qualified applicants were previously eliminated
erroneously, a reworked admissions system would pit White applicants
against minority applicants with which they previously did not compete.
Disparate impact analysis thus actually could strengthen meritocracy.
The newly formed merit system would, furthermore, implicitly
value diversity. In order to eliminate the disparate impact, the new facially
neutral process would have to acknowledge various incarnations of merit
in order not to have the discriminatory effect that current criteria do. A
school would be forced to acknowledge, for instance, that the Scholastic
Aptitude Test (SAT) only measures one kind of ability and that other
skills, such as writing ability or work ethic, should be weighed more heav-
ily. The reworked merit system, while not nominally delineating groups,
would also encompass the broader spectrum of relevant talents, accom-
plishments, perspectives, and potential exhibited in a diverse society.
The Court has made it clear that benign race conscious policies are
noxious to the principle of equal protection, which calls for a colorblind
government. 6 Unintended negative consequences of race conscious admis-
celebrities. See Ralph Frammolino et al., UCLA Eased Entry Rules for the Rich, Well-
Connected, L.A. TiMES, Mar. 21, 1996, at A1. When considering Bakke, the Supreme Court
was never told that the Dean of U.C. Davis personally admitted approximately six appli-
cants each year that the office of admissions had rejected or waitlisted. DREYFUS &
LAWRENCE, supra note 67.The Supreme Court was forced to take a fresh look at university
admissions in the recent University of Michigan cases and acknowledged the fallacy of
merit in admissions:
The rallying cry that in the absence of racial discrimination in admissions
there would be a true meritocracy ignores the fact that the entire process is
poisoned by numerous exceptions to "merit." For example, in the national
debate on racial discrimination in higher education admissions, much has
been made of the fact that elite institutions utilize a so-called "legacy" pref-
erence to give the children of alumni an advantage in admissions. This, and
other, exceptions to a "true" meritocracy give the lie to protestations that
merit admissions are in fact the order of the day at the Nation's universities.
Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2359-60 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
64. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,436 (1971).
65. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("governmental
action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most circumstances ir-
relevant and therefore prohibited---should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed")
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sions policies, such as stigma and racial animosity, are similarly offensive to
equal protection.66 States, furthermore, are increasingly eliminating the use
of affirmative action because such policies contravene an otherwise le-
gitimate merit system. Instead of evaluating applicants on the basis of
intelligence, skills, and accomplishments, it is argued that affirmative ac-
tion bases admission on what ought to be meaningless physical
characteristics, such as race and sex. 8
Advocates of affirmative action defend its use by arguing, among
other things, that it remedies the effects of societal discrimination and
creates diversity.6 9 The Court recognizes that, despite the harm caused by
race conscious state action, diversity is an interest so important to institu-
tions of higher education that it justifies race conscious admissions for the
70time being. Others argue that minority racial status should be consid-
ered a part of students' merit for admission because of the value their
identities bring to the school.7'
Disparate impact analysis applied to an admissions process could
serve as a suitable compromise between these two positions. It would do
some of affirmative action's diversity work while maintaining an
ostensibly colorblind merit system. In other words, the process would be
facially neutral and neutral in effect, and still measure an applicant's
qualifications. As a matter of public policy it may be attractive to have
diversity as an explicit value in higher education through affirmative
action. While affirmative action is still constitutionally permissible72 there
is no reason it cannot be employed along with disparate impact analysis.
(internal citations and quotations omitted); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)
("[a] core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally
imposed discrimination based on race"); see also Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,
100 (1943) ("Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their
very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality. For that reason, legislative classification or discrimination based on race alone has
often been held to be a denial of equal protection.").
66. See, e.g., Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (stating that
racial classifications used for something other than remedying identified past
discrimination "may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of
racial hostility").
67. JOEL DREYFus & CHARLES LAWRENCE II,THE BAKKE CASE: THE POLITICS OF INE-
QUALITY 23-24 (1979); Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14.
68. See sources cited supra note 67.
69. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2338; see generally Devon Carbado, What Exactly Is Ra-
cial Diversity?, 91 CAL. L. Rav. 1149 (2003); Brief of Amici Curiae on Behalf of
Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325 (2003), reprinted in 9 MICH.J. RACE & LAw 5, 16-21 (2003).
70. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2339 (holding that the law school had a compelling
interest in creating a diverse student body).
71. See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirinative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195,1247-48 (2002).
72. See Grutter, 123 S. Ct. at 2346-47.
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Disparate impact analysis would rework facially neutral criteria to be
more equitable and meritocratic. Affirmative action could then be
employed to sift through qualified applicants to render a student body
even richer with perspective, ability, and life experience.
While it may be difficult to conceive of the college admissions
process as any different than it is now, we should not assume that the tra-
ditional factors are perfect measures of a student's qualifications.
73
Moreover, as discussed in Part III, disparate impact analysis might not re-
quire drastic alterations to the admissions process in order to eliminate
unnecessary discriminatory effect.
II. EDUCATIONAL NECESSITY
With the justifications above in mind, the next step would be to
fashion a legal standard that is affective of those purposes and can be feasi-
bly applied by the courts. The crux of disparate impact analysis is the
necessity standard ("educational necessity" in the context of admissions as
opposed to "business necessity" under Title VII). When a plaintiff chal-
lenges an admission criterion for its discriminatory effect, a school will
respond that the criterion is necessary to achieve some purpose of the
admissions process. If the necessity standard is too narrow, it will be pro-
hibitively difficult for a school to achieve its educational purposes and
operational needs. If the conception of necessity is too broad, however,
schools might escape any meaningfiil change. Therefore, the educational
necessity standard ought to be fashioned thoughtfully with regard to two
different issues. First, it should be informed by the nature of the educa-
tional institution. Assuming that part of a school's purpose is to select
qualified students, whatever that may entail for a particular school, this
aspect of the necessity standard will ensure that "merit" remains a funda-
mental principle in the admissions process when disparate impact analysis
is applied. Second, the procedural strictures of the educational necessity
standard must be designed to effectively eliminate unnecessary disparate
impact. Ultimately, a school should be given latitude to define its own
needs, but the criteria it utilizes must be the best available means of serv-
ing those needs.
73. For example, grades are a reasonably accurate predictor of future success in
school, but do not predict professional success very well. See Sturm & Guinier, supra note
23, at 963.Test scores are similarly imperfect. While they purportedly do and ideally would
predict future success, it is widely disputed whether they accurately represent the variety
of skills that make for a successfil student. See, e.g., Allen R. Kamp, The Missing Jurispru-
dence of Merit, 11 B.U. PuB. INr. LJ. 141, 142; Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 970. As
for professional achievement, test scores have even less predictive value than grades. See
Sturm & Guinier, supra note 23, at 970. None of these factors, however, can perfectly dis-
cern an applicant's motivation, perseverance, teamwork skills, and emotional constitution.
See id.
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A. Educational Necessity Defined
Educational necessity is a largely unexplored legal concept. In the
few instances in which disparate impact analysis has been applied to edu-
cational institutions, most courts and commentators have conceived of
educational necessity as analogous to business necessity. 74
In order for selection criteria to be consistent with business neces-
sity they must be "job-related. 7 5 Job-relatedness requires that selection
criteria bear "a significant relationship to successful performance of the
job., 76 Businesses are primarily enterprises for profit. Thus, requiring busi-
nesses to have job-related criteria effectively encompasses a business's
goals with regard to hiring--selecting employees who will perform the
duties of the job well.
The facet of educational necessity that is analogous to business ne-
cessity is, thus, the need to evaluate applicants for their ability to perform
the duties of a student, or "studies-relatedness." This model has been
adopted in the Title IX regulations that prohibit disparate impact on the
basis of gender," in the ABA Standards regarding law school admissions,7
in the small body of case law interpreting the Title VI disparate impact
regulations, 79 and in the academic commentary on educational necessity.8°
The business model is a good analogy for educational necessity in
some respects.8' When a student excels it can be seen as indicative of a
74. Bd. of Educ. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130, 151 (1979); see also Salahuddin ex rel. Sharif
v. NewYork State Educ. Dep't, 709 E Supp. 345,362 (S.D.N.Y 1989).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2003); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
433-36 (1971).
76. See H.R. Ru'. No. 102-40(11), at 10 (1991).
77. 34 C.FR. § 106.21(b)(2) (2004).
78. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, Stan-
dard 503 (1998) ("A law school shall require all applicants to take a test for the purpose of
assessing the applicants' capability to satisfactorily completing its educational program.").
79. See Elston v. Bd. of Educ., 997 E2d 1394, 1412 (11th Cir. 1993) (applying dispa-
rate impact analysis to public school districting scheme); NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d
1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying disparate impact analysis to public school tracking
practices); Groves v. Dep't of Educ., 776 F Supp. 1518, 1529-32 (M.D.Ala. 1991) (applying
disparate impact analysis to the use of the ACT Assessment for admission to teacher train-
ing program); Salahuddin ex rel. Sharif v. New York State Educ. Dep't, 709 F Supp. 345,
362 (S.D.N.Y 1989) (applying disparate impact analysis to a scholarship program based
entirely on SAT scores).
80. See Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 189-90;Wrona, supra note 18, at 14-16.
81. In a recent article, Jennifer Braceras argues that educational necessity in any
form lacks feasibility. She contends that business necessity, as embodied by productivity
and profit margins, is justiciable because those factors are quantifiable, unlike a student's
motivation and ability to learn. See Braceras, supra note 18, at 1191. Braceras conflates
outputs with inputs, however. The proper comparison is between productivity, an
employee's output, and grade point average, class rank, research and writing, a student's
output, which can be quantified similarly to productivity and profit margins in the
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successful educational program, just as successful employees make the
business successful. 8 2 Students who can meet the demands of their studies
are necessary to an effectively functioning educational program. A capable
83student can enhance the experience of fellow students . Excellent stu-
dents and successful alumni help a school's bottom line by bolstering its
reputation among future applicants."' A successful student is also more
likely to be able to make donations in the future.
A school's necessities are, however, not adequately encompassed by
the selection of qualified students, and therefore may not adequately be
served by simply adhering to studies-related criteria, as businesses are
served with job-related criteria. A school's institutional needs extend be-
yond selecting qualified students because students are customers rather
than employees and because schools serve broad, lofty purposes for society
generally Educational necessity should therefore encompass more than
studies-relatedness. Additional considerations of an educational institu-
tion's institutional operational needs and mission should be a part of the
educational necessity standard.
An admissions process serves the operational necessity of a school in
a few different ways. A school's admissions process will presumably admit
a number of students that is consistent with the minimum income needs
of the institution. Because students' families are also potential donors,
most schools also admit applicants whose relatives are alumni (legacies).8
The admissions process itself can be designed to be efficient and inexpen-
employment sphere. The inputs, an applicant's qualifications, moreover, can be equally
nebulous and subjective in both education and employment depending upon the context.
82. See Braceras, supra note 18, at 1191. The job-relatedness, or studies-relatedness,
of admissions criteria is, however, a more variable and complex inquiry than in employee
hiring. Students are customers, not employees.They receive a service as well as take part in
providing one. A student's success in the context of education is, therefore, to a degree,
defined and attained on her own terms and serves her own goals and desires. The conse-
quence of this relationship is that an educational admissions process must focus, more so
than a business's hiring process, on measuring potential for success in a manner that is
responsive to the applicant pool's interests, not exclusively its own survival. The educa-
tional necessity of admissions criteria cannot, therefore, be defined entirely in terms of
"job" related validity. Applicants fill an educational institution's needs by succeeding, but
their success cannot be entirely defined by the institution prior to admittance. An admis-
sions process must therefore be flexible enough to consider, on the one hand, an
applicant's individual goals and, on the other hand, an applicant's ability to satisfy tradi-
tional measures of success like grades.
83. See, e.g., Statement by the Dean of the University of Michigan Law School's to
Prospective Students, University of Michigan Law School Official Website, at http://
www.lawumich.edu/prospectivestudents/welcome/dean.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2004).
84. Id.
85. In the 1960s, Columbia University eliminated legacy preferences. The resultant
drop in donations was so marked that it returned to using them shortly thereafter. See Jack
Greenberg, Affirmative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory, 43
B.C. L. Racy. 521,537 (2002) (citing information he acquired during his tenure as Dean of
Columbia College).
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sive in order to aid budgetary needs as well. Finally, the admissions system
promotes institutional survival by satisfying the political constraints put on
a school by trustees and perhaps the state government.
Beyond an educational institution's operational necessity, the law
must recognize a school's mission necessity, or the social goals that
transcend institutional survival. The broad, nebulous, and variable societal
roles schools serve complicate educational necessity in a manner not
applicable to businesses. Schools are means for the advancement of
knowledge, 6 socioeconomic doors for students, breeding grounds for
leaders, and venues for socialization."' A school is, much more than an
employer, a social institution rather than an individualistic endeavor."" In
adherence to these ideals, an admissions process might consider an
applicant's leadership skills, motivation, and professional goals. 9
Educational institutions might need to consider more than a student's
potential for success in the classroom (the analogue to job-relatedness),
and also consider how a student will contribute to the learning
environment or society after graduating. The various "mission-related"
purposes of education will be manifested differently depending on the
educational program-undergraduate, elite undergraduate, professional
school, or small graduate programs. The mission necessities of the
institution, though, will certainly bear on how it selects students, and the
law ought to value these social goods.90
86. See, e.g., ROBERT KLITGAARD, CHOOSING ELITES, 116-31 (1985).
87. See, e.g., WLLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK CURTIS Boc, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER,
118-54 (1998); Amy GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (1987);Wrona, supra note 18, at
1-2.Wrona argues:
Education is crucial in an industrialized and highly technical society. This is
true not only for individuals who hope to use their education to gain em-
ployment, but also for any nation that hopes to keep pace in an extremely
competitive global market. Colleges and universities play a vital role in stu-
dents' personal growth as well as their preparation for future careers.
Wrona, supra note 18, at 1-2.
88. The independence of employers from social responsibility is reflected to a de-
gree in Title VII jurisprudence, which attempted to avoid overburdening the employer or
undermining the employer's ability to remain efficient and reap profits. See, e.g., Wards
Cove Packing Co. v.Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,652 (1989).
89. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, BUYING THE BEST: COST ESCALATION IN ELITE
HIGHER EDUCATION (1996); ELIZABETH A. DUFFY & IDANA GOLDBERG, CRAFTING A CLASS:
COLLEGE ADMISSIONS AND FINANCIAL AID 1955-1994 (1998).
90. To a certain extent, operational necessities like selecting qualified students serve
the mission necessities of the school in the end. If educational necessity, therefore, only
included operational considerations mission necessity would not get neglected entirely.
This is, perhaps, one reason why business necessity is not defined in terms of mission. It is
assumed that operational necessity--selecting on the basis ofjob-related qualities--directly
and conclusively correlates with a business's mission of reaping greater profits. The social
ends of higher education, however, do not so closely correlate with operational needs and
therefore must be considered explicitly as a part of educational necessity.
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B. The Standard: How to Apply Educational Necessity
Disparate impact analysis applied to admissions processes should util-
ize a bifurcated educational necessity standard in which the purposes served
by admissions must be merely legitimate, but the criteria chosen to serve
those purposes must do so precisely. The first prong defers to a school's wis-
dom as to its own needs and essential purposes. Courts lack specialized
knowledge in educational theory and policy, and should therefore refrain
from intruding upon educational institutions' discretion in those regards. 91
In order to eliminate unfair discriminatory effect, however, the standard
should require that a school's chosen criteria are precise instruments to
serve the institution's stated goals, and the least discriminatory method of
achieving those goals. This a court can effectively assess with expert data
and testimony.
92
Broadly speaking, there are four procedural standards from which
disparate impact law might choose for its necessity justification. The law
could require that criteria either: strictly correlate to an absolute necessity,
loosely correlate to an absolute necessity, strictly correlate to any legiti-
mate purpose, or loosely correlate to any legitimate purpose. 93 These four
standards exhibit varying degrees of deference to the institution.
91. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2339 (2003) ("The Law School's
educational judgment that such diversity is essential to its educational mission is one to
which we defer."); Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (1985)
("When judges are asked to review ... a genuinely academic decision ... they should
show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment ... [and] ... may not override it
unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate
that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judg-
ment."); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42 (1973) ("[T]his case
also involves the most persistent and difficult questions of educational policy, another area
in which this Court's lack of specialized knowledge and experience counsels against pre-
mature interference with the informed judgments made at the state and local levels."); cf
Sandlin v. Johnson, 643 E2d 1027, 1029 (4th Cir. 1981) ("Decisions by educational au-
thorities which turn on evaluation of the academic performance of a student ... are
peculiarly within the expertise of educators and are particularly inappropriate for review
in a judicial context.").
92. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 1007 (1988) ("[A] variety
of methods are available for establishing the link between these selection processes and job
performance.... Courts have recognized [ I the results of studies ... the presentation of
expert testimony ... and prior successtul experience.").
93. Disparate impact was first applied under Title VII with a standard akin to the
strict version of necessity-the selection criterion had to be essential to job performance.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431,436 (1971); see also NAACP v. Georgia,
665 F2d 1403, 1418 (11th Cir. 1985). Under this version of necessity, while requiring a
high school diploma would have increased the overall level of education of the workforce,
this was not a necessity for a proficiently skilled workforce. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 433.
Later, the Eleventh Circuit articulated a similar standard and required that the selection
policy be "legitimate, important, and integral to the defendant's institutional mission."
Elston v. Bd. of Ed., 997 F2d 1394, 1413 (11th Cir. 1993).The Griggs standard was later
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It is my contention that the goals of an admissions process should
need only be "legitimate." If the purpose of the policy is within the scope
of the institution's purpose, the law should not go further to require
courts to assess how necessary, or conversely how dispensable, the policy
is. An educational institution needs discretion in order to be responsive to
its clientele and fulfill its social role. Courts generally give a good degree
of deference to educational institutions to determine their own legitimate
goals.94 One could argue that doing so renders "legitimacy" meaningless,
as the term seems to imply sanction by an outside entity. The expertise
and experience of educators is self-legitimating, however. The complexity
of the economic, social, and ideological issues calls for those with special-
ized knowledge and experience to make educational policy decisions. 5
Under a legitimacy standard courts would still retain the power to
prevent schools from stepping beyond the bounds of their area of
expertise. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania took this approach to
"legitimacy" in Cureton v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n.96 Instead of
legitimacy encompassing anything vaguely related to the nature of the
institution, the court limited legitimacy to those interests within the core
isiuin97
purposes of the institution. The court stated that "[t]he proper scope of
[the NCAA's] authority must be circumscribed to requirements
softened by the Supreme Court in Wards Cove to only require that a selection practice be
"manifestly related to the legitimate ends" of a business.Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989) (later overruled by the 1991 Civil Rights Act). Legitimacy is a
far cry from necessity. The most inconsequential of goals could be a legitimate undertak-
ing. Indeed, legitimate has been defined to be neither "essential" nor "indispensable." Id.;
Elston, 997 E2d at 1412 (citing NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F2d at 1417-18).The only limita-
tion is that the selection criterion cannot be "spurious." Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
The Wards Cove test has been interpreted to have called for a strict correlation to a
legitimate end, calling not only for the purpose to be legitimate but also for a criterion to
be "manifestly related" to the purpose it serves. See cases cited supra note 79. This standard,
like legitimacy, is not without bite in theory. To be manifestly related is more than a mere
rational relationship. It is a "nexus" of sorts. Cureton v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 37
E Supp. 2d 687, 706, 707 (E.D. Pa. 1999) ("Merely being abstractly rational, as opposed to
arbitrary, will not suffice."); see NAACP v. Harrison, 940 E2d 792,802 (3d Cir. 1991).
94. See cases cited supra note 91.
95. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,42 (1973).The Rodriguez
case was a school quality suit involving questions of districting, taxation, and budget
allocations. It is distinguishable from a disparate impact suit against an admissions process
in that it involved policy concerns that extended well beyond the litigated issue. While
reorganization of an admissions process might involve some budgetary changes for a
school, it does not implicate anything as broad or as far outside the scope of traditional
adjudicative power as a city government's budget or tax scheme.Thus, deference may not
be as necessary for an admissions process. A school is, however, more inextricable from
public policy than a business, as discussed above, and deference is extended to educators
even for decisions that are small in scope, such as dismissal of a student. See id.
96. 37 E Supp. 2d 702 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
97. Id. at 702-04.
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pertaining only to student athletes." 98 The NCAA had no legitimate
interest in promoting overall graduation rates of the student body.99
An additional proviso of the legitimacy standard should be to only
allow ex ante justifications to legitimize criteria. To do otherwise would be
to turn disparate impact analysis into rational basis scrutiny and make
victory for a plaintiff nearly impossible. '°° In GI Forum v. Texas Education
Agency,'0 ' for instance, the court was able to ignore the stated justification
for a standardized graduation test and instead stated its justifications ad
hoc. 10 2 Upon implementation, the articulated goal of the test was to "hold
schools, students and teachers accountable for education and to ensure that
all Texas students receive the same, adequate learning opportunities."' 0 3 The
various purposes of the test should have been tested for their relationship to
this educational goal. Instead, the court justified the test circularly. When
the test needed to be justified for its validity in measuring skills
acquisition, the court said that the legitimate goal of the institution was
skills inculcation.14 When the chosen cut-off score needed justification,
the court said the legitimate goal was setting a minimum graduation
score. 105 When it was challenged on the basis of using it as a graduation
requirement, the state's legitimate interest was "setting standards as a basis
for awarding of diplomas."' 0 6 The court used ex post justifications to
legitimize the criterion circularly. In Cureton, the court rejected this
approach and limited the acceptable justifications for the criterion to
those articulated when it was implemented. 10 7 Thus, closing the gap
between graduation rates of White and Black athletes was not a legitimate
goal because it was not the purpose behind the adoption of the test score
. 1 108minimums.
Allowing ex post rationalizations would make necessity an empty
standard. Merely requiring ex ante justifications, however, is a formal pro-
98. Id.
99. Id. at 702. A school would likewise not have a legitimate interest in discriminat-
ing or, conversely, creating an all White student body, as that is an impermissible goal
under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VI. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2338
(2003).
100. ' Professor Richard Fallon argues that "judicial scrutiny under rational basis re-
view is typically so deferential as to amount to a virtual rubber stamp." Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., The Supreme Court, 1996 Term, Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 H~av. L. REy.
56,79 (1997).
101. 87 F Supp. 2d 667 (W.D.Tex. 2000).
102. Id. at 679-81.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 679-80.
105. Id. at 680-81.
106. Id. at 681.
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viso easily undermined by a potpourri of ex ante justifications or one all-
encompassing justification. The legitimacy standard is therefore only ef-
fective when it is limited to ex ante justifications that fall within the
legitimate purposes of the institution. For instance, a law school should
not be able to avoid legal attack by stating beforehand that its admissions
process is designed to "better humanity." As stated, the goal is too broad
and vague to reasonably be considered a part of the school's area of ex-
pertise and is therefore not a legitimate purposes. The law school's
overarching goal would be better stated as producing excellent lawyers.
The important difference between legitimacy and a strict necessity
standard is that under the former, the court is limited to discerning the
legitimate scope of the institution's purpose and should not, as with the
latter, weigh the various purposes of an institution and decide which are
most important and which are dispensable. The standard is, admittedly,
one that is still pliable for a court that is determined to find the institu-
tion's articulated justification for the criteria illegitimate. The policy of
deference underlying the "legitimacy" standard, however, should rein in
such a court or at least make the decision correctable on appeal.
An educational institution's discretion in formulating the best ad-
missions policy for the times would be undermined by a strict necessity
standard. Relying on plodding legal precedent to define what is necessary
in admissions would hamstring schools both as businesses and as agents of
opportunity and progress. Drawing the line, furthermore, as to which
goals are important enough to meet the standard would be difficult to get
right the first time. Disparate impact analysis for educational admissions
policies should therefore defer to the institution to set its own goals
within the parameters of legitimacy, as defined above.
After ascertaining the legitimate purposes of an admissions criterion,
the next step is requiring employers to show that the criteria strictly serve
those purposes. There should, for instance, be a strict correlation between
a good score on the standardized test required for admission and success
in the program. If a school employs an index score that combines test
scores and GPA, that index should predict success closely. In this aspect of
the inquiry, courts need not defer to the institution. It is a substantive in-
quiry that requires a degree of expertise, but it does not involve the court
in macro policy making. Instead, the court is finding facts as to how well
a school is adhering to the school's own policy goals.
Determining just how closely correlated they need be is the hard
part. A standard akin to strict scrutiny's narrow tailoring would be
effective. Narrow tailoring would require that the policy be considerably
more empirically precise than imprecise and would ultimately ensure that
the utilized criterion be a necessity. While narrow tailoring can be a
109. Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Purpose: A Comprehensive Approach to
Strict Scrutiny Afier Adarand and Shaw, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 14-15 (2000).
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malleable standard, it is so to a far lesser degree than the other possibilities:
requiring a "manifest relationship,""0 "substantial relationship, '  or a
"significant relationship."' 1 2
The "manifest relationship" standard neither provides guidance to
schools and courts nor ensures that the intent of the law will be reflected
in judgments. In NAACP v. Georgia, for instance, the challenged practice
was tracking "achievement grouping" of students, and the institutional
necessity was articulated as "classroom education" '1 3 Because "achieve-
ment grouping" or tracking was an "active pedagogical practice" it had a
manifest relationship to its purpose.14 Instead of demanding that the prac-
tice be a well-honed tool for serving the school's purposes as a narrow
tailoring requirement would, the court justified the disparate impact of
tracking by pointing out that many schools use it.
Requiring either a "substantial" or "significant" relationship is
equally vague and potentially ineffective. Neither indicate whether a cri-
terion must be more precise than imprecise, meaning that it captures
more people with the desired attribute than it rejects. They only imply
that there is some degree of correlation between the criterion and its
purpose that happens to sway the court in a given case. Any and all crite-
ria could pass scrutiny as long as they had some empirical relationship to
their purpose."'
The only consistent principle the Supreme Court has used to ani-
mate the "substantially related" requirement is that laws that operate on
the basis of stereotypes or myths are not substantially related."1 6 That rule
does very little in the disparate impact context because none of the ad-
missions criteria are likely to be entirely imprecise measures of a skill,
based only on stereotypes and myths about racial groups. Furthermore,
the standard essentially only ensures that the criteria are not irrational
tools for admission. In order to make disparate impact analysis in admis-
110. See cases cited supra note 79.
ill. See, e.g., Lunding v. N.Y Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 298 (1998) (holding
that state action that abridges privileges and immunities must be substantially related to an
important governmental objective); Heckler v. Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 744 (1984) (hold-
ing that gender discrimination can only be justified if it has a substantial relationship to an
important governmental objective).
112. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), at 10 (1991).
113. NAACP v. Georgia, 665 F2d 1403, 1418 (1 lth Cir. 1985).
114. Id.
115. Requiring a stricter correlation between the criterion and necessity is not
without its difficulties, however. It would be difficult to apply a consistent standard
without somehow quantifying the level of precision at which a selection criterion must
serve the purposes of an educational institution. Mere rationality is a clearer line, but such
a standard would provide no further incentive to use nondiscriminatory policies as is
already provided by considerations of administrative efficiency and institutional mission.
Narrow tailoring gives disparate impact analysis bite in curing discriminatory effects.
116. See, e.g., Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1979 (2003).
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sions effective, the necessity standard must ensure that selection criteria
are precise tools for the selection of students.
Requiring that the criteria are narrowly tailored to the purpose also
incorporates the least discriminatory alternative requirement of Title VII
disparate impact analysis. Narrow tailoring requires proof that there is not
a less discriminatory alternative."' Under Title VII, once the defendant
justifies the criterion by necessity, the plaintiff can show that there are less
discriminatory alternatives. The burden of persuasion remains, however,
on the defendant to show that the existing criterion is indeed the least
discriminatory alternative for achieving the stated purpose. "8 This alloca-
tion of burdens provides an incentive for institutions to innovate in order
to meet their needs equitably, instead of resting the onus of research and
development on plaintiffs." 9 The plaintiff is poorly equipped to offer fea-
sible alternatives and the institution is well equipped to innovate prior to
litigation and then to justify its policy in court. 20 Disparate impact for
admissions policies should therefore require narrow tailoring of the crite-
rion to the educational purpose and thereby place that burden on the
institution.
Allocating the burden in this way will have numerous policy bene-
fits. Because schools will have a greater incentive to engage in preventive
innovation, the amount of litigation will be lower. Placing the burden on
the plaintiff, on the other hand, would lead to subsequent suits where
plaintiffs continue attempting to find less discriminatory alternatives.'
2'
Demanding strict correlation and placing the burden of proving that cor-
relation on the institution also conveys a normative message that
discriminatory effect is unacceptable if it does not occur with good rea-
son.
An application of strict necessity is open to the critique that it will
be difficult for an institution to justify a disparate impact and that, as a
result, it will resort to covert quotas in order to avoid litigation. 22 This
concern is, however, less relevant to educational institutions than
employers. Considering how legally perilous educational quotas are,123 it is
unlikely that a college or university will risk implementing a quota just to
save resources. The burden of disparate impact litigation, furthermore, has
117. See, e.g., C &A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383,392 (1994); Or.Waste
Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100-01 (1994); Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441
U.S. 322,337-38 (1979).
118. See H.R. REP. No. 102-40(i), at 7 (1991).
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Less Discriminatory Alternatives in Dis-
parate Impact Litigation, 106 HAiv. L. REV. 1621, 1627 (1993).
122. See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,652 (1989).
123. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2342 (2003) (citing Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,315 (1978)).
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a built-in sunset clause. By using a strict but effective necessity standard,
disparate impact on minorities in admissions and overall socioeconomic
inequality will be mollified.The basis for a disparate impact suit will, thus,
be eliminated. Moreover, there will likely be a ripple effect from one
successful suit, as schools are shown by example how to comply with the
law. 124
A broad definition of educational necessity implemented with preci-
sion is therefore a feasible and effective necessity standard for applying
disparate impact analysis to admissions policies. This standard defers to the
expertise of the school when the complexity of the issues demands, but
retains its ability to eliminate unnecessary discrimination.
C. Other Proposals
Other conceptions of necessity have been proposed that attempt to
capture and answer similar concerns, but they are not suitable for admis-
sions processes. First, some commentators have suggested that Title VII
disparate impact law should differentiate between entry-level positions
and those requiring more skill.12 - One would apply a strict necessity to
the former, and require only legitimacy for the latter. 126 Less competitive
undergraduate admissions are perhaps the analogue to entry-level hiring,
and graduate school the analogue to managerial hiring. While this pro-
posal honors concerns about expertise by deferring to the institution
when it seems appropriate, it provides no normative justification for why
positions requiring more nuance in selection should be any less subject to
disparate impact laws. The proposal further leaves a large and very fuzzy
middle ground between entry-level positions and executives. Deference
to the institution in defining necessity followed by a narrow tailoring re-
quirement offers more consistency and therefore provides a clearer
standard around which institutions can design their policies.
Two different balancing inquiries have been proposed as well. One
suggests balancing the minority applicant's loss of employment opportu-
nity with the employer's benefit from using the policyJ 27 For a school a
124. Just as law schools and undergraduate institutions were given a general model
for implementing affirmative action in admissions by the Supreme Court in Grutter and
Gratz, a successful disparate impact suit will yield an injunction and a judicial opinion
upon which schools can model their admissions systems. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S.
Ct. 2325, 2338-47 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411,2437-40 (2003).
125. Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate
Impact Cause ofAction: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REv. 1479, 1522 (1996).
126. Id.
127. Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination
Cases, 30 GA. L. kEv. 387, 416 (1996); Gary A. Moore & Michael K. Braswell, "Quotas"
and the Codification of the Disparate Impact Theory: What Did Griggs Really Say and Not Say?,
55 ALB. L. REv. 459, 492 (1991); see also Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798
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minority applicant's loss of access to higher education would be balanced
with the school's gain. How to quantify the loss of opportunity in order
to accurately compare it to an institution's gain is not clear, however. Even
if one could find a way to make the comparison, though, such a utilitarian
analysis would reduce disparate impact law's concern for equality to sim-
ple cost-benefit analysis and thereby forsake any sense of rights. If high
costs could justify allowing discrimination, the costs of discrimination
would continue to fall on its victims.125
Another balancing approach suggests weighing the necessity of the
goal against how well the criterion correlates to that goal: the more im-
portant the goal, the less correlation would be required. 129 This approach is
counterproductive, however. If the goal is extremely important, and the
criterion is allowed to achieve that goal in a loose fashion, the goal is not
necessarily being achieved. The disparate impact would be justified despite
the fact that the criterion serves the institution's purposes poorly. Like
other balancing tests, this proposal also lacks feasibility. There is no consis-
tent or quantifiable method for courts to assess the importance of the goal
and then determine how precisely the criterion serves it. Lastly and more
fundamentally, this approach forces courts into a realm in which they have
little or no expertise-where they must assess the importance of an insti-
tutional goal instead of deferring to the institution's expertise. 130
III. DISPARATE IMPACT ANALYSIS APPLIED
This Part first applies the proposed standard to a series of hypotheti-
cal cases. Then, it discusses some potential problems in adjudicating
disparate impact claims, and proposes concrete changes to a specific ad-
missions process.
A. Applying Disparate Impact to Various
Hypothetical Admissions Systems
Schools have many different admissions criteria and ways of
evaluating those criteria. For examples, the criteria could be objective or
subjective. The process could involve only one criterion or be a
(4th Cir. 1971) (holding that a business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to over-
ride any racial impact).
128. See Note, supra 121, at 1630.
129. See, e.g., Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 E2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981)
(permitting a lesser showing of manifest relationship between practice and goal because
the goal of safety was of great importance); Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 E2d 216 (10th
Cir. 1973) (holding that the employer's burden of demonstrating the job-relatedness of a
criterion varies with the skills required for the job and the interest in hiring qualified
people); Grover, supra note 127.
130. See supra note 91.
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multi-component evaluation. A multi-component evaluation could
involve any combination of criteria, and the decision could be either a
holistic assessment of all the criteria or each criterion could form a
barrier or cut-off in a process of elimination. If the decision is holistic,
such a decision could be subjective or objective. However, the variety of
admissions standards is not a barrier to application of a disparate impact
test.
A school might utilize a single criterion admissions process based on
an objective evaluation, such as a standardized test score. If the test were
not race neutral in its effect, disparate impact analysis would force the
school to consider alternatives that could accurately assess qualifications,
but do so without the disparate impact. A different standardized test might
work, one that measures qualifications in a way that does not favor one
culture over another. The school might also switch to a different criteria,
like grades or class rank, or consider a multi-component process.
A multi-component admissions process presents a more difficult ju-
dicial inquiry. A multi-component admissions decision might entail a
holistic decision, involve cut-offs, or both. When a holistic decision is at
issue, disparate impact analysis would play out differently depending on
whether the decision is based on objective weighting of each criterion
combined into a total score, or a subjective decision based on the candi-
date as a person. A multitude of factors could influence decisions on any
particular candidate-standardized test scores, grades, extracurricular ac-
tivities, personal experiences beyond school, and background. One
particular factor would not always carry the same weight from one candi-
date to another. Great numbers might win the day for one applicant,
extracurricular accomplishment for another, and resonant personal ex-
periences for another.
For a process that objectively weighs different criteria but combines
them to make a holistic decision, the court could still consider each
criterion as an individual barrier. T13 Although mitigated by the other crite-
ria, each factor would have an independent effect on the admission
decision that could, independently, cause a disparate impact.1 *2 The
weighting of each factor could also contribute to a discriminatory effect,
in which case, the weighting system itself would be challenged for its dis-
criminatory effect. This difference in analysis would depend on which
aspect of the policy the plaintiff could prove caused the disparate im-
pact-the weighting system or a substantive criterion. The potential
solutions to either, however, would be the same. The school could limit
the scope of some factors and weight others more heavily in order to be
131. See Eric Lasker, The Appearance ofJustice and the Bottom Line Defense, 99 YALE L.J.
865,870 (1990).
132. Id. at 871.
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more equitable, and still discern meritorious students. Further, some fac-
tors could also be discarded if unnecessary.
Some components of multi-component systems might exist as inde-
pendent cut-offs. An applicant would have to meet a certain standard with
regard to one criterion in order to make the cut and be considered in
terms of another criterion. In such a case, each cut-off is an independent
barrier to admission if it has a discriminatory effect. Each cut-off could
then be scrutinized independently for disparate impact and necessity.
Further, subjective criteria, such as an essay or an interview, might
also be integrated with objective factors in a multi-component process.
The same solutions that are available for objective criteria are also avail-
able for subjective criteria. If they are given a numerical weight in the
process, it could be lowered. Some criteria could be rejected altogether or
others could be added.
B. Problems with Adjudicating Disparate Impact Analysis
Courts and commentators have raised concerns about both the fea-
sibility of adjudicating such disparate impact claims and fairness to the
defendant institutions in allowing the claims to be made. These concerns
are for the most part, and sometimes entirely, unwarranted.
The Supreme Court has held that in a Title VII disparate impact
case, when a plaintiff challenges a multi-component selection decision,
the plaintiff must identify "the specific employment practice that is
challenged." 133 The Court has warned that out of fairness, "[e]specially in
cases where an employer combines subjective criteria with the use of
more rigid standardized rules or tests, the plaintiff is in our view
responsible for isolating and identifying the specific employment practices
that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical disparities. 1 34 It is
possible to satisfy this concern while challenging a multi-faceted
admissions process. When challenging a holistic process a plaintiff could
argue that a particular factor or factors are unnecessary in light of other
factors in the process that serve the same or similar purpose. The plaintiff
could also specifically attack the method of weighting the factors in
relation to each other. In either case, the plaintiff identifies a specific
practice that causes the disparate impact.
Two prominent concerns arise when considering subjective criteria
under disparate impact law. First, the assertion has been made that
subjective decisions, because they are inherently colored by individual
judgment, cannot be facially neutral. Therefore, the argument continues,
subjective decisions fall categorically outside the boundaries of disparate
impact analysis, which addresses facially neutral criteria that have a disparate
133. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,994 (1988).
134. Id.
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impact. 35 For this reason, some argue that subjective criteria can only be
scrutinized for intent to discriminate.13 6 This argument, however, confiuses
facial neutrality with objectivity. Facially neutral in the context of
antidiscrimination law means ostensibly unrelated to race or other
protected categories of persons. For example, writing samples or interviews
are facially neutral in relation to as race and can have a discriminatory
effect on minority applicants.
137
The Supreme Court has also considered whether it is unfair to al-
low challenges to subjective criteria based on disparate impact because it
is difficult to defend against such challenges. 138The contention is that nu-
anced considerations of motivation and compatibility are never absolutely
necessary, except in very exclusive application processes like graduate
school programs, and impossible to defend because they cannot be scien-
tifically validated. 13 If, however, subjective criteria were insulated from
disparate impact scrutiny because of the burden on selectors, selectors
could insulate every selection process from judicial scrutiny with some
sort of subjective criteria. 4 Subjective criteria must therefore be included
within the purview of disparate impact analysis.41
Disparate impact analysis can thus be applied to a wide variety of
admissions criteria, as well as entire processes. While some processes may
push the boundaries of disparate impact jurisprudence due to their com-
plexity and subjectivity, most fears about proof and causation are
unwarranted. Not all criteria are ultimately faulty, however. A school must
be able to run an effective admissions process and a defense of necessity
will protect criteria that are essential to that purpose.
135. See Alfred W Blumrosen, The Legacy of Griggs: Social Progress and Subjective Judg-
ments, 63 CHi.-KENT L. REV. 1, 34-35 (1987).
136. Some lower courts similarly misunderstood challenges to subjective decisions
and allowed a demonstration that there was a legitimate reason for the decision to rebut a
disparate impact claim. See id. A showing that other members of the plaintiff's group were
selected, or that members of her group were involved in the selection decision, have also
been accepted as defenses. Id. These defenses are, however, irrelevant to a disparate impact
claim because they only show that the decision was void of discriminatory intent.
137. In this sense, there is no real distinction between subjective and objective deci-
sions for the purposes of disparate impact analysis. See Anthony Sanchez, Defining the Proper
Bounds of Disparate Impact Analysis: Beyond an Objective/Subjective Employment Criteria Di-
chotomy, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 657, 677 (1988). Disparate impact is meant to be applied to a
situation in which a plaintiff claims that her qualifications are unnecessarily ignored or
denigrated by the selection criteria. Id. Subjective and objective decisions can deprive an
applicant of equal opportunity in an identical fashion.
138. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988) ("[Respondents]
also argue that subjective selection practices would be so impossibly difficult to defend
under disparate impact analysis that employers would be forced to adopt numerical quotas
in order to avoid liability.")
139. See id. at 991-92.
140. Id. at 989.
141. Id.
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C. The Possibilities for Change:A Brief Case Study
Since 1995, the University of Michigan's undergraduate school of
Literature, Science, and the Arts (LSA) has amended its admissions system
several times. These changes, taken individually, provide examples of ways
in which a school can alter its admissions system that are affective of dis-
parate impact analysis's purpose and ways that are not.
During 1995 and 1996, LSA admissions officers evaluated
applications according to GPA combined with "SCUGA" factors: the
quality of an applicant's high school (S), the strength of an applicant's high
school curriculum (C), an applicant's unusual circumstances (U), an
applicant's geographical residence (G), and an applicant's alumni
relationships (A). 42 These scores were combined to produce an applicant's
"GPA 2" score. 43 Admissions officials then admitted students on the basis
of "Guidelines" tables, which listed GPA 2 ranges on the vertical axis, and
American College Test (ACT) or SAT scores on the horizontal axis.
Each table was divided into cells that included one or more courses of
action to be taken: admit, reject, delay for additional information, or
postpone for reconsideration. 14 Applicants in the same cell were subject
to different admissions outcomes based upon their racial or ethnic
status.
146
Under this system, standardized test scores would seem to play a
nearly determinative role in a candidate's admission. Prior scholarly
achievement and personal qualities are reduced to one variable, GPA 2, of
equal value to a candidate's test scores. 47 If a racial minority typically
scored lower on these standardized tests, a class of plaintiffs could sue
under a theory of disparate impact.48 They could argue that admission
should not be an equal function of the GPA 2 score and standardized test
score because test scores reflect disparities in wealth, test preparation, and
socioeconomic perspective that disfavor minority test-takers.
49
In 1997, LSA made changes to reflect these disparities but did so in
a manner designed to simply admit minority students, rather than refine
the system to be an accurate measure of qualifications independent of






148. Even if race conscious preferences such as the one utilized here create an equi-
table bottom line, plaintiffs can still sue under a theory of disparate impact because they
are denied the opportunity to compete equally with other candidates, based on the ac-
cepted criteria. See Connecticut v.Teal, 457 U.S. 440,451 (1982).
149. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 155-60.
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socioeconomic disparities.5 LSA changed the formula for calculating an
applicant's GPA 2 to include additional point values under the "U"
category in the SCUGA factors.' Specifically, applicants received points for
underrepresented minority status, socioeconomic disadvantage, or
attendance at a high school with a predominantly underrepresented
minority population, or underrepresentation in the unit to which the
student was applying (for example, men who sought to pursue a career in
nursing) . Instead of creating a more precise system, it simply offset the
racial disadvantage created by the existing criteria with express
consideration of minority racial status. The system, furthermore, retained its
emphasis on standardized test scores. The 1997 admissions process would
thus still be vulnerable to a disparate impact claim.
For the 1998 academic year, LSA discarded the Guidelines tables
and the SCUGA point system for a "selection index," on which an appli-
cant could score a maximum of 150 points.5 3 Each application received
points based on high school GPA, standardized test scores, quality of high
school, strength of high school curriculum, in-state residency, alumni rela-
tionship, personal essay, and personal achievement or leadership.
5 4
Applicants could receive up to twelve points for standardized test scores;
up to ninety-eight points for high school grades, strength of curriculum,
and strength of school; ten points for being a Michigan resident; four
points for being a child of an alumnus; up to three points for the quality
of the essay; and up to five points for personal achievement such as lead-
ership or public service.-' Under a "miscellaneous" category, an applicant
was entitled to, among other things, twenty points based upon his or her
membership in an underrepresented minority group and up to two points
for residency in a underrepresented state. This index was divided into
ranges calling for admissions dispositions as follows: 100-150 (admit); 95-
99 (admit or postpone); 90-94 (postpone or admit); 75-89 (delay or post-
pone); 74 and below (delay or reject).' 6
This system considers applicants in great detail and according to ob-
jectively weighted criteria.5 17 Most importantly, the 1998 system finally
moderates the importance of standardized test scores, making it one factor
among many. The connection between SAT scores and academic per-
150. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2419.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 2431 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 2419-20; Joint Appendix at 182-97, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411
(2003) (No. 02-516).
157. Joint Appendix at 182-97, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-
516).
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formance is dubious"" and its disparate impact on minority applicants is
apparent. By making grades of greater importance, the system evaluates
applicants relative to their surroundings rather than exacerbating socio-
economic disadvantage. 5 9
Several states have abandoned use of the SAT completely and in-
stead rely on GPA and class rank.' 60 Initial results from Texas's use of this
system show that high school grades appear to correlate with excellent
academic performance better than SAT scores.16 ' Thus, by downplaying
the significance of test scores and making academic performance more
important, LSA made their admissions system more fair and equitable
without sacrificing academic excellence.
62
The 1998 system is still susceptible to a challenge, however, based on
the apparent importance of high school curriculum and strength of the
school. These factors clearly disadvantage minorities from lackluster
schools and poor school districts that do not have good academic reputa-
tions and do not offer prestigious curricula like Advanced Placement and
International Baccalaureate classes. The question would be whether
school reputation and strength of curriculum are truly indicative of stu-
dent's academic ability. Might smart students from lesser schools just begin
college with a smaller base of knowledge that is a negligible factor in
their ability to proceed? Or do those admissions criteria accurately indi-
cate the strength of a candidate for admission? A plaintiff might also argue
that essays should be given more weight. Why not place more weight on
this intimate look into a candidate's writing ability, clarity of expression,
and personality?
In 1999, LSA established an Admissions Review Committee (ARC).
The ARC flagged for review applications that demonstrated that the
158. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 195-96.
159. According to Kidder and Rosner:
For example, in the last few years it was about equally as difficult for White
college-bound seniors to obtain either a 600+ Verbal or 600+ Math score on
the SAT as it was for them to rank in the top 10% of their high school class.
In contrast, it was considerably more difficult for Black and Chicano seniors
to score over 600 on a section of the SAT than to rank in the top 10% of
their high school class ... [T]he disparate impact of requiring a 600+ on a
section of the SAT is roughly twice as severe as the adverse impact of requir-
ing graduation in the top 10% of the class.
Id. at 143.
160. Id. at 193 nn.32-36.
161. Id. at 202-03.
162. Justice Scalia recently suggested during the oral arguments in Gratz that if the
University of Michigan wanted to admit more minority students it should just set lower
standards. Oral Argument at 37-38, Gratz v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003) (No. 02-
516). It was the University's fault, he implied, for wanting to be a simultaneously diverse
and elite institution. Id. These data suggest that no such compromise need be made.
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student: (1) is academically prepared to succeed at the university; (2) has
achieved a minimum selection index score; and (3) possesses a quality or
characteristic important to the university's composition of its freshman class,
such as high class rank, unique life experiences, challenges, circumstances,
interests or talents, socioeconomic disadvantage, or underrepresented race,
ethnicity, or geography. After reviewing "flagged" applications, the ARC
determined whether to admit, defer, or deny each applicant.
1 63
Once again, LSA made disadvantage a qualification rather than
reforming the facially neutral criteria to not have a discriminatory effect
on disadvantaged applicants. The essence of the reform may be positive,
though. One can imagine a system where, after assessing an applicant's
academic qualifications in a manner that does not reflect socio-economic
disparities, the school would evaluate applicants in the remaining pool
broadly and holistically in light of their personal qualities. This would
appear ideal for purposes of eliminating disparate impact and not
infeasible or overly burdensome, as the University takes the time and
effort to read essays and consider individual experiences already.
CONCLUSION
Disparate impact analysis is justified in the context of higher
education because race is not yet irrelevant to competition for admission.
Minority applicants who are still suffering from the effects of purposeful
discrimination are at a competitive disadvantage to those who benefited
from de jure segregation. Disparities in income, residential segregation,
and persistent racism still disproportionately hinder the progress of
individuals in the racial minority and cause a disparate impact in
admissions processes.16 4 Equal opportunity in education, in this light, does
not begin and end with the start and stop of a proctor's watch, but
involves consideration of historical discrimination and its influence on the
results of otherwise neutral selection criteria.
The optimal solution to this problem is to hold schools responsible
for making sure this impact only occurs when absolutely necessary to a
school's legitimate purpose. If there are other criteria that can measure
those factors necessary to the school's legitimate purpose, without dispro-
portionate effect, schools should utilize them. Disparate impact scrutiny
applied to admissions processes would accomplish this purpose.
The thought of anything but the current criteria being the corner-
stone of admissions and merit is unnerving, undoubtedly. Standardized
tests and grades are sacred monuments in the American sense of individ-
ual merit, and admission into college, or graduate or professional schools
is the reward of excellence.Yet, disparate impact analysis neither calls for a
163. Gratz, 123 S. Ct. at 2419-20.
164. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,806 (1973).
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radical departure from traditional criteria nor from one's sense of merit in
higher education. The traditional system may only need to be changed
and perhaps broadened to encompass new yardsticks for merit and simul-
taneously admit a representative student body. Disparate impact analysis
provides, furthermore, a boundary at which changes must end.That is, an
admissions process could not so drastically be forced to change as to
thwart the achievement of educational necessities.
Disparate impact analysis could be applied to admission processes
through administrative action under Title VI.' 6s Addressing the problem
entirely through administrative action could have several policy advan-
tages. From a plaintiff's perspective, administrative action might be
attractive because the agency would put its legal and investigatory re-
sources toward winning the claim. 66 From a policy perspective, the
relationship between an agency and the school might have a more coop-
erative tone than between parties in a private suit. Part of the agency's role
would be to achieve the purpose of the regulations and their enabling
statutes, and not merely to redress an injury or punish wrongdoing. An
agency can, furthermore, address the problem with a specific expertise.
Creating a private cause of action or suing under Section 1983 may
for those same reasons, however, oblige more widespread and definitive
change.' 67 Administrative action could be weak and slow because of the
cooperative relationship between agencies and the institutions they over-
see. Political tides may also influence the Department of Education's zeal
for social change, its available resources, and even the substantive policy
goals of the agency.
Admissions policies as they now exist are not broken. They are,
however, unchallenged by the law to be refined in order to provide equal
opportunity. At the same time, innovation is happening, and some feasible
alternatives are out there. 168 Social scientists have performed studies of
admissions that have yielded encouraging results. 69 Several state university
have stopped using standardized tests and rely only on high school
grades.170 Bowdoin College stopped using the SAT two decades ago and
has retained the same prestige among liberal arts colleges. 7' To be sure,
more research and development needs to be done before disparate impact
suits in admissions can be widely successful and force major change. The
165. See sources cited supra note 15.
166. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 205-06.
167. Id.
168. For a discussion of law school admissions and viable diversity fostering alterna-
tives, see Michael A. Olivas, Higher Education Admissions and the Search for One Important
Thing, 21 U. ARK. LiTTLE ROCK L. REv. 993 (1999).
169. Kidder & Rosner, supra note 14, at 155-60.
170. Id. at 193 nn.32-36.
171. Andrea F Silverstein, Note, Standardized Tests: The Continuation of Gender Bias in
Education, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 669, 695-96 (2000).
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law as is currently utilized, however, fails to give even sufficient incentive
for schools to change. In order to make admissions more fair and equita-
ble, disparate impact analysis should either be actively enforced through
administrative action or made available to private plaintiffs.
